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Abstract. This article identifies apparent inconsistencies in United States Government explanations for 
its current policy towards Iraqi noncompliance with the inspection and monitoring requirements of the 
United Nations. The article then posits an explanation for these inconsistencies in explanation. 
 
For many months United States Government (USG) public policy has constituted a vow to launch a 
military attack--unilateral or bilateral--against Iraq if the latter interfered with the inspection and 
monitoring functions of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The rationale for this policy seems to involve the need to prevent and deter Iraq 
from operationalizing biological, chemical, nuclear, and ballistic missile assets, technology, and 
knowledge. The need to identify and destroy what had been or could be accomplished in Iraqi efforts to 
operationalize has constituted UNSCOM's and IAEA's inspection and monitoring goals towards 
prevention and deterrence. 
 
Now, however, the USG criterion for military attack has moved temporally closer to a noxious Iraqi 
behavioral endpoint--from interfering with inspections to actually producing weapons of mass 
destruction. The rationales for this change--per se and as inconsistent with previous policy--present yet 
additional inconsistencies. 
 
For example, if the main purpose of inspection and monitoring is to prevent and deter weapons 
production through robust identification and destruction, how can one even know that production has 
occurred if inspection and monitoring cannot occur? Yet again, USG officials have stated that USG 
intelligence assets--apparently human, satellite, and aircraft--are sufficient at least for monitoring Iraqi 
activities. If this is the case, why require UNSCOM and IAEA to engage in inspection and monitoring at 
all? 
 
A further quote attributed to a senior USG official: "A confrontation…in Iraq may prove a point, but it 
doesn't get you closer to what you want to accomplish, which is to help UNSCOM do what it needs to 
do" (Erlanger, August 15). The problem here is that historical data suggest that confrontation--e.g., 
stopping very short of military intervention--seems to have facilitated Iraqi noninterference with 
UNSCOM and IAEA. What novel event or analytic tour de force allows one to arrive at a different 
conclusion at present? 
 
US Secretary of State Albright has tried to confront the above inconsistencies in two ways. First, she 
contends that these inconsistencies are not inconsistencies. By not engaging in a military attack on Iraq, 
the USG is allowing for a critical mass of concern to build on the UN Security Council that will lead to a 
military attack. Also, by not engaging in a military attack on Iraq and allowing Iraqi interference with 
UNSCOM and IAEA to continue, the USG is ensuring the continuation of sanctions that also hinder Iraqi 
operationalization of weapons of mass destruction. A counter to her contentions? In both cases, time 
seems to be working on the side of the Iraqis as nation-states with varying economic, social, cultural, 
and political agendas seek to return to the status quo that existed before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
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Moreover, a strong case can be made that Saddam Hussein seems willing to tolerate sanctions in return 
for no or less inspections and/or monitoring. 
 
The advancing of apparently inconsistent rationales through time--each rationale embellished with the 
trappings of logic--suggest that something illogical may be fueling USG decisionmaking. (Beyond 
Lewinskian rational and irrational considerations). Rationalization--the unconscious utilization of logic as 
a compromise expression of illogical and irrational conflict--may be that something. The USG political 
dynamic towards Iraq may involve less the serious and conscious concerns of Iraqi weapons proliferation 
and employment and more the contamination of unconscious enemy images--the latter rendering an 
enemy more dangerous in the political world and in the world of the psyche. (See Erlanger, S. (August 
14, 1998). U.S. retreats from vow to use force if Iraq blocks inspectors. The New York Times, p. A4; 
Erlanger, S. (August 15, 1998). U.S. urged arms monitor to back off from clash with Iraq. The New York 
Times, p. A5; Fointiat, V. (1998). Rationalization in act and problematic behaviour justification. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 471-474; Gillett, E. (1998). Relativism and the social constructivist 
paradigm. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 5, 37-48; von Hecker, U. (1997). How do logical 
inference rules help construct social mental models? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 367-
400.)(Keywords: Ballistic Missiles, Biological Warfare, Chemical Warfare, Iraq, Nuclear Warfare.) 
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